

Development of Guidance for Analysis of Beyond Design Basis Events

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Background

- ▶ Types of DOE Facilities
 - Research Reactors;
 - Weapons disassembly, maintenance, and testing facilities;
 - Nuclear material storage facilities;
 - Processing facilities; and waste disposal facilities.

- ▶ Safety Analysis Framework
 - DOE Nuclear Safety Policy
 - Nuclear Safety Rule
 - Nuclear Safety Analysis Standards
 - Documented Safety Analysis Guide

Background (continued)

- ▶ Nuclear Safety Rule Requires
 - *Consideration of the need for analysis of accidents which may be beyond the design basis of the facility.*

- ▶ Amplifying Guidance in Documented Safety Analysis Standard
 - *Consider the need for analysis of accidents that may be beyond the design basis of the facility in order to provide a complete perspective on the risk associated with operating the facility.*

Steps to Look for Improvements to Guidance

- ▶ Internal review of DOE requirements and guidance for safety analysis, facility design, and emergency response;
- ▶ Review of response to DOE Safety Bulletin 2011-1;
- ▶ Monitoring of regulatory actions in the commercial and international nuclear power industry;
- ▶ Nuclear Safety Workshop in 2011;
- ▶ Recommendations in DOE Report to Secretary in August 2011, *Review of Requirements and Capabilities for Analyzing and Responding to Beyond Design Basis Events*;
- ▶ Results of Pilot Evaluation Studies conducted at several DOE facilities during 2012.

Insights

- ▶ DOE safety analysis processes require evaluation of all credible internal events using a bounding analysis.
 - Exception: External Events and Natural Phenomena Events have a specified frequency or performance goal that are utilized to define the size of event.

- ▶ The results of these analysis show that the large majority of DOE nuclear facilities do not have the potential for a significant impact to the public.

Insights (continued)

- ▶ Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) at existing DOE Hazard Category 2 facilities have some level of Beyond Design Basis Event (BDBE) analysis.
- ▶ DSAs could be improved with expanded discussion of BDBEs that considers a spectrum of Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH) events and additional details regarding accident management strategies.
- ▶ In most cases, BDBE analysis can be accomplished using simplified qualitative techniques and assumptions and drawing on conclusions reached in Design Basis Analysis.

Insights (continued)

- ▶ Relationship to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Driven Efforts for Nuclear Power Plants
 - Multi-step Effort (“immediate,” near-term, longer-term)
 - Focus on NPH
 - Includes walkdowns
 - Includes look at regulatory framework

- ▶ Relationship to other BDBE efforts
 - Nexus to European Community “stress tests”
 - Use of Industry tools for walk downs and seismic evaluations

Evaluation of Existing Facilities

- ▶ Walkdown to Look for Vulnerabilities
 - Focused on NPH
- ▶ Critical Safety Function (CSF) Identification
- ▶ Qualitative Evaluation of Potential Impacts of BDBEs on One or More CSFs
 - Cliff Edge Effect
- ▶ Look at Margins to Failure of Equipment Important to CSFs when Subject to BDBEs
 - Involves walkdown and review of design documents
- ▶ Look for Potential Design, Operations, or Emergency Response Improvements

Evaluation of Existing Facilities (continued)

- ▶ Evaluation Team
 - Multi-discipline
 - Safety Analysis
 - NPH Expert
 - Operations
 - Emergency Management

- ▶ Documentation of Results

- ▶ Maintenance of Enhancements

Potential Operating Experience Report

- ▶ Discuss Lessons Learned from Pilots.
- ▶ Provide Guidance for Performance of Reviews.

Guidance for New Facilities

- ▶ Amplify Guidance on evaluation of BDBEs to look for potential design/operation/emergency response enhancements.
- ▶ Focus on determination of whether there is a cliff edge effect.
- ▶ Provide guidance on how to document analysis and maintenance of any identified enhancements.